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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5372
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TEL AVIV 07373

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, IS
SUBJECT: AMPART DR. GARY SAMORE CITES NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION RISKS IN LECTURE AND TALKS WITH GOI
LEADERSHIP

1. CONFIDENTIAL -ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN MEETINGS WITH SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS AND ISR
INTELLECTUALS MAY 21-22, SPECIAL ADVISER TO AMBASSADOR-AT-L
RICHARD T. KENNEDY, GARY SAMORE, DESCRIBED U.S. EFFORTS TO
WITH POTENTIAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS IN IRAN AND I
AND EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAELI COOPERATION WITH U.
NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. ON THE QUESTIO
ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT, HE MET A SKEPTICAL AUDIENCE I



ISRAELI OFFICIALS DECLINED TO PROMISE ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD
SIGNING THE NPT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OVERALL REGIONAL
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO THE RECENT EGYP
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PROPOSAL FOR A BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WAS EQUAL
RELUCTANT. THE ONLY ISRAELI CONCESSION WAS A HINT OF
WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE MATTER, IF APPROACHED DIRECTLY B
THE EGYPTIANS. THE ISRAELIS ALSO INDICATED GREAT CONCERNS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
DATE/CASE ID: 24 FEB 2005 200403679

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ABOUT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, INCLUDING THEIR FEAR THAT IRA
WILL RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND PAKIS.

ON WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD JOIN A GLOBAL CW BAN, [REDACTED]
PROMISED A RESPONSE TO THE U.S. DEMARCHE ON THE
SUBJECT AT THE JPMG, BUT INDICATED THAT HE,
PERSONALLY, IS UNCLEAR ON WHAT THE U.S. IS LOOKING
FOR FROM ISRAEL. ALSO DISCUSSED HAS ISRAEL'S REFUSAL
TO JOIN THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

SAMORE ALSO OUTLINED U.S. EFFORTS TO PREVENT A
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA AND
REVIEWED ACTIONS TAKEN TO SLOW THE FLOW OF
NUCLEAR-RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY TO IRAQ AND IRAN. HE
ALSO RESPONDED TO ISRAELI QUESTIONS ON STATE OF PLAY
ON THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, THE PROPOSAL FOR AN
ARAB ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, AND THE IAEA GENERAL
CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

3. AMPART GARY SAMORE, SPECIAL ADVISER TO
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE RICHARD T. KENNEDY, MET MAY 21
AND 22 WITH A BROAD SPECTRUM OF ISRAELI LEADERS. ON
MAY 21, HE LECTURED AT HEBREW UNIVERSITY ON NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE REGION. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] SAMORE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
POLMIL OFFICER SEGAL.

ISRAEL SHOULD SIGN THE NPT

4. IN HIS ADDRESS AT HEBREW UNIVERSITY, SAMORE NOTED
THAT ISRAEL'S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO SIGN THE NPT GIVES
IT THE DUBIOUS DISTINCTION OF HAVING THE ONLY
UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN THE REGION. HE
STRESSED THAT THIS RISKS PROVIDING AN INCENTIVE TO
OTHER REGIONAL STATES TO SEEK THEIR OWN NUCLEAR OR
OTHER UNCONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY. THE NET RESULT IS
LESS SECURITY FOR ISRAEL.

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5. [REDACTED] SAMORE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO HOPE ISRAEL WILL SIGN THE NPT AND PUT ALL ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION. WHILE HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTY OF ISRAEL DOING SO IN THE ABSENCE OF A REGIONAL PEACE AGREEMENT, SAMORE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT ALL COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD RENOUNCE THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE A SPECIAL CASE. SAMORE SAID THAT GREATER ATTENTION ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN IRAN AND IRAQ WILL INEVITABLY FOCUS ATTENTION ON ISRAEL, AND THAT THE U.S. WILL NEED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT BELIEVES ISRAEL SHOULD SIGN THE NPT, AS MOST OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION HAVE ALREADY DONE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPRESS A WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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6. IN RESPONSE, [REDACTED] ARGUED THAT SINCE THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, ISRAEL CAN NO LONGER SEPARATE NUCLEAR FROM NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, NOR COULD IT IGNORE THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN THE REGION. HE NOTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SAID, AND FOREIGN MINISTER ARENS HAS REITERATED, THAT ISRAEL IS READY TO PURSUE REGIONAL APPROACHES WITH NEIGHBORING STATES. SAMORE ARGUED THAT ISRAEL COULD IMPROVE THE CHANCES FOR ITS HOPED-FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE BY SIGNING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. IN HIS LATER DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAMORE RECEIVED MUCH THE SAME RESPONSE.

EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL TO BAN MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS

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7. [REDACTED] SAMORE ASKED HOW ISRAEL PLANS TO RESPOND TO EGYPT'S CALL FOR A BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE REGION. [REDACTED] SAID ISRAEL'S INITIAL RESPONSE HAS TO REITERATE THE PRIME MINISTER'S 1989 REGIONAL INITIATIVE. HE STRESSED THAT PROGRESS TOWARD NON-PROLIFERATION WAS INTERCONNECTED TO PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. SAMORE NOTED THAT THE U.S. AGREED THAT ARMS CONTROL IN THE REGION NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

8. SAMORE MENTIONED THAT THE U.S. HAD WELCOMED EGYPT'S DECISION TO TAKE A LEADERSHIP ROLE ON PROLIFERATION ISSUES, BUT HAD NOT COMMITTED ITSELF TO SUPPORTING ANY NEW MODALITIES. THE U.S., HE SAID, WANTS TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING INITIATIVES, E.G., THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE AND GLOBAL CW BAN. WE ARE, HOWEVER, WILLING TO TALK TO

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THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT HOW TO INTEGRATE THEIR PROPOSAL WITH EXISTING INITIATIVES.

9. IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE [REDACTED] SAMORE EMPHASIZED THAT A POSITIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH CAIRO. [REDACTED] SAID THE GOI IS CAREFULLY STUDYING THE PROPOSAL AND FOREIGN MINISTER MEGUID'S LETTERS. HOWEVER, THESE HAD TO TAKEN TOGETHER WITH SADDAM HUSSAYN'S STATEMENTS (MAY 1).

10. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT SADDAM HAD THREATENED CW USE FIRST IN RETALIATION, THEN IN RESPONSE TO ANY ATTACK ON AN ARAB STATE, THEN HE HAD SAID HE HAD GIVEN CONFIDENTIAL

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PERMISSION FOR FIELD COMMANDERS TO INITIATE CW USE WITHOUT FURTHER ORDERS, IF ATTACKED. THIS CHAIN OF STATEMENTS HAS DEEPLY TROUBLING TO ISRAEL SINCE IT RAISED THE SPECTER OF AN IRAQI COMMANDER USING CW AGAINST ISRAEL, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, IN RETALIATION FOR AN ISRAELI RAID ON A TERRORIST BASE IN LEBANON, FOR EXAMPLE.

11. [REDACTED] SAID ISRAEL IS EXTREMELY CAREFUL ABOUT WHAT IT COMMITS ITSELF TO DO BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE TO ADHERE TO ANY COMMITMENT IT MIGHT MAKE IN THE ARMS CONTROL ARENA. HE NOTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S IMMEDIATE REACTION HAS THAT ISRAEL HAS OFFERED TO DISCUSS A CW FREE-ZONE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS ALWAYS AGREED TO TREAT THESE ISSUES SEPARATELY. HE REJECTED ANY THOUGHT OF LINKING ISRAELI NUCLEAR TO IRAQI CHEMICAL CAPABILITIES. SAMORE CONFIRMED THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT FAVOR THIS LINKAGE.

12. [REDACTED] HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE MUBARAK STATEMENT PROVIDES "THE FIRST SIGN OF WILLINGNESS ON EGYPT'S PART TO CONSIDER A REGIONAL APPROACH", INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS AMONG REGIONAL STATES. SAMORE SEIZED ON THIS ADMISSION, SAYING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL TO CONVEY THAT MESSAGE TO EGYPT. [REDACTED] DEMURRED, ARGUING THAT SINCE THE PROPOSAL HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY PASSED TO ISRAEL BY EGYPT, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ISRAEL TO RESPOND.

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13. ASKED BY POLMIL OFFICER SEGAL WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD JOIN THE GLOBAL BAN ON CW, [] SAID HE HOPED THE FINAL DOCUMENT WOULD PROVIDE MECHANISMS THAT WOULD ALLOW ISRAEL" TO CONSIDER JOINING." HE SAID ISRAEL MIGHT SIGN IF A REGIONAL INITIATIVE COULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS WELL. CITING THE FEBRUARY 1990 AND NOVEMBER 1989 EDITIONS OF A PUBLICATION ("THE CW

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CONVENTION BULLETIN"), [REDACTED] SAID HE HAS MAJOR CONCERNS ABOUT THE INSPECTION PROPOSALS UNDER DISCUSSION.

14. ASKED WHETHER ANY STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN TO RESPOND TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLARKE'S DISCUSSION OF THE CW BAN AT THE JPMG, [REDACTED] MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH [REDACTED] REGARDING LISTS OF SITES TO BE OPEN FOR INSPECTION, SUSPECT SITES AND SITES CLOSED TO INSPECTION. IT WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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ALSO CLEAR THAT NO SERIOUS WORK IS BEING DONE TO ADDRESS THOSE QUESTIONS.

NOT CLEAR WHAT THE U.S. WANTS ISRAEL TO DO

15. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] HE POINTED OUT THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DIMONA NUCLEAR FACILITY WOULD NEVER BE OPEN TO INSPECTION. HE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF, SAY, IRAQ, EGYPT, OR EVEN THE U.S. WERE TO CHALLENGE DIMONA SIMPLY TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE ON THE PLANT. HE INDICATED THAT THE GOI IS "STILL NOT CLEAR ON WHAT A/S CLARKE WANTS." HE PREDICTED THAT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WOULD ULTIMATELY PROVIDE A FORMAL RESPONSE.

16. [REDACTED] ALSO EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE CURRENT DRAFT TREATY'S APPROACH TO CW PRODUCTION. HE REMARKED THAT SCHEDULE THREE OF THE PROPOSED BAN INCLUDES FACILITIES PRODUCING CHEMICALS AS INNOCUOUS AS TABLE SALT. HE SAID ISRAEL IS STILL A LONG WAY FROM A DECISION OVER WHETHER SUCH A BAN WOULD ENHANCE OR ENDANGER ISRAELI SECURITY.

NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

17. ASKED [REDACTED] WHICH NON-MEMBER PARTICIPANTS WERE LIKELY TO ATTEND THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, SAMORE INDICATED THAT CHINA, POSSIBLY FRANCE, AND PROBABLY INDIA AND PAKISTAN, WILL ATTEND. ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL WILL ALSO ATTEND. SAMORE ALSO NOTED THAT
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SOUTH AFRICA IS EXPECTED TO BE AT THE REVCON, HOPEFULLY AS A MEMBER STATE. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD ATTEND AS AN OBSERVER.

18. SAMORE REMARKED THAT THE U.S. HAS NO INDICATION, AS YET, IN WHAT CAPACITY THE PLO WOULD ATTEND, BUT THE U.S. WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT BY THE PLO TO ATTEND AS THE "STATE" OF PALESTINE. [REDACTED] RECALLED A RUMOR THAT THE PLO MIGHT TRY TO SIGN THE NPT. SAMORE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE U.S. WAS AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY, NOTING THAT MEMBER STATES WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IF THE PLO WERE TO SEEK TO DEPOSIT AN INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION WITH, SAY, THE USSR. HE SAID THE U.S. WAS LOOKING INTO THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THIS ISSUE (I.E., WHETHER THE USSR RECOGNIZES THE PLO AS A STATE) AND REMARKED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY PREFER NOT TO BE DRAGGED INTO SUCH A POSITION.

19. [REDACTED] ASKED ABOUT IRAQ'S NPT STATUS GIVEN BAGHDAD'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN WEAPONS-RELATED HARDWARE. SAMORE SAID IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARE OPERATING EFFECTIVELY THERE. THE U.S. HAS NOT ACCUSED IRAQ OF VIOLATING ITS NPT COMMITMENTS, BUT WE HAVE SAID THAT ITS ACTIVITIES RAISE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT ITS LONGTERM NUCLEAR INTENTIONS. THE U.S. EXPECTS A DISCUSSION OF COMPLIANCE ISSUES AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHICH WILL PROBABLY INCLUDE IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA. HE NOTED THAT THE POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR ISRAEL TO ALSO BE A FOCUS OF ATTENTION, ESPECIALLY IF ARAB STATES FEEL COMPELLED TO RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON IRAQ. [REDACTED] AGREED THAT THIS WAS VERY LIKELY.

20. [REDACTED] MENTIONED THAT AN EGYPTIAN PAPER ALREADY

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IN CIRCULATION CONTAINED IMPLIED AND EXPLICIT
REFERENCES TO ISRAEL THAT WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE
GOI, AND, HE HOPED, THE U.S.

21. ON THE QUESTION OF NORTH KOREA'S STATUS, SAMORE
NOTED THERE HAS BEEN AN UNACCEPTABLE DELAY IN
IMPLEMENTING SAFEGUARDS AND NO CHANGE IN THE DPRK'S
POSITION THAT COMPLETION OF A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
REQUIRES CHANGES IN U.S. DECLARATIONS OR DEPLOYMENTS
IN THE SOUTH.

PAKISTAN

22. IN RESPONSE TO [REDACTED] QUESTIONS, SAMORE
OUTLINED THE U.S. VIEW OF PAKISTAN'S SITUATION. HE
EXPLAINED THAT PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO HAS GIVEN
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ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE U.S. SEES NO DEVIATION FROM THAT COMMITMENT. THE U.S. IS DOING WHAT IT CAN TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN BY ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. PAKISTAN HAS LONG OFFERED TO TAKE A NUMBER OF RECIPROCAL STEPS WITH INDIA, AND THE U.S. IS TRYING TO PERSUADE INDIA TO RESPOND TO THESE PROPOSALS.

23. REGARDING POSSIBLE PAKISTANI TIES TO IRAQ -- THE "ISLAMIC BOMB" ISSUE -- SAMORE SAID PAKISTAN FEARS IRAQ AND SEES NO BENEFIT IN ARMING A POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME NEIGHBOR. IN RESPONSE TO [REDACTED] QUESTION ABOUT LIBYAN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN, SAMORE ALSO SAID THAT WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT ARAB COUNTRIES ARE FUNDING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

24. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT IRAQ'S MISSILE PROGRAM GIVES IT SOMETHING OF VALUE TO OFFER PAKISTAN IN EXCHANGE FOR NUCLEAR EXPERTISE. SAMORE STRESSED THAT HIS IMPRESSION FROM DIRECT TALKS WITH PAKISTANI OFFICIALS AND INTELLECTUALS LEADS HIM TO CONCLUDE THERE IS LITTLE SENTIMENT FOR CLOSER LINKS WITH BAGHDAD. HE NOTED THAT ISLAMABAD MUST ALWAYS REMAIN SENSITIVE TO ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, WHICH WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY TO ANY COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND PAKISTAN.

25. [REDACTED] ARGUED THAT RISING TENSIONS IN KASHMIR MIGHT TEMPT PAKISTAN BOTH TO SEEK A "QUICK FIX" FROM IRAQ IN THE MISSILE SPHERE, AND TO PURSUE MORE AGGRESSIVELY THE NUCLEAR OPTION. SAMORE
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ACKNOWLEDGED THAT KASHMIR DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CREATED A DANGEROUS SITUATION, NOTING THAT BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE AN INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY TO PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SAMORE SAID THE U.S. IS TRYING TO DEAL WITH THIS DANGER BY WORKING TO RESOLVE TENSIONS OVER KASHMIR AND BY ENCOURAGING INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. SAMORE SAID THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS WISH TO AVOID A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, BUT POLITICAL FACTORS HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT TO TRANSLATE THIS INTO PRACTICAL ACTIONS.

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26. SAMORE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE IS NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND ARGENTINA, BUT THIS COOPERATION HAS BEEN LIMITED TO PEACEFUL TECHNOLOGY UNDER SAFEGUARDS. SAMORE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR KENNEDY HAS HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES ON THIS ISSUE, INCLUDING HIS CURRENT TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA. WE HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM BUENOS AIRES THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT PROVIDE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, SUCH AS ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING, TO IRAN.

INDIA

27. LIKE PAKISTAN, SAMORE SAID INDIA HAS NO INTEREST IN EXPORTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. IN FACT, AFTER THE 1974 "PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION", INDIA TURNED DOWN SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR JOINT PROJECTS. SAMORE NOTED THAT TIES BETWEEN INDIA AND IRAQ ARE NOT VERY WARM. HE DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM.

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IRAN AND IRAQ.

28. [REDACTED] SAMORE SAID THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED THAT IRAN AND IRAQ MAY SEEK TO ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY, ALTHOUGH THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER COUNTRY COULD ACHIEVE THIS CAPABILITY IN A SHORT TIME. SAMORE OUTLINED TWO U.S. INITIATIVES IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS TO LIMIT ACCESS BY IRAN AND IRAQ TO NUCLEAR-RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT. ONE INITIATIVE WAS A SERIES OF DIRECT APPROACHES BY THE U.S. TO ALL POTENTIAL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING THE USSR AND CHINA. THE RESULTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN VERY POSITIVE, WITH ALL AGREEING ON THE NEED TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN AND IRAQ.
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29. THE OTHER INITIATIVE WAS A CONCERTED EFFORT TO DEAL WITH SMUGGLING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, HARDWARE, AND TECHNOLOGY. THE RECENT "STING" OPERATION IN LONDON AGAINST IRAQ ILLUSTRATED THE SUCCESS OF THE LATTER EFFORT. THE U.S. HAS ALERTED ALL OTHER POTENTIAL TARGETS TO THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING. SAMORE SAID THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN IRAN AND IRAQ REQUIRES ACCESS TO FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, AND THE U.S. IS MAKING STRONG EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT IRAN AND IRAQ WILL NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED TECHNOLOGY.

30. SAMORE ALSO NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS APPROACHED

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IRAQ DIRECTLY, WARNING THAT IF BAGHDAD VIOLATES THE NPT, IT WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. SAMORE SAID THE U.S. HAS ASKED OTHER COUNTRIES TO MAKE THIS SAME POINT TO IRAQ. THE U.S. IS ALSO DETERMINED TO CONVINCING BOTH IRAQ AND, INDIRECTLY, IRAN, THAT IT IS IN NEITHER COUNTRY'S INTERESTS TO PURSUE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION.

31. SAMORE SAID THE U.S. IS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE OTHER MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES, SUCH AS EGYPT, TO DISSUADE IRAQ FROM TAKING SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS IN ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM, WHICH WILL INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE REGION. SAMORE SAID THE CURRENT LIMITED NUCLEAR COOPERATION IN THE ARAB WORLD INVOLVES PEACEFUL PROJECTS AND IS ENTIRELY UNDER SAFEGUARDS.

U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION

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32. ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, SAMORE OUTLINED THE COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET EFFORT OVER THE YEARS. HE NOTED THAT BOTH POWERS AGREE ON THE COMMON GOALS OF STRENGTHENING THE NPT AND MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS. SAMORE ALSO NOTED THAT THE U.S. AND USSR WILL BE ISSUING A JOINT STATEMENT ON EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR, AS WELL AS CHEMICAL AND MISSILE, PROLIFERATION AT THE UPCOMING SUMMIT.

BLACK-MARKET NUCLEAR TRADE

33. ASKED [] ABOUT BLACK MARKET SOURCES OF NUCLEAR HARDWARE AND MATERIALS, SAMORE NOTED THAT THE KEY CHOKE POINT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES TO BE ACCESS TO ENRICHED URANIUM OR PLUTONIUM. OVER THE YEARS THIS HAS REMAINED UNDER GOOD CONTROL BY THE NUCLEAR-SUPPLIER STATES. SAMORE ACKNOWLEDGED EFFORTS BY IRAQ AND OTHERS TO USE BLACK MARKET SOURCES AND NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS SUCCESSFULLY FOILED SUCH EFFORTS. WEST GERMANY HAS ALSO BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DENYING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO IRAQ.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ

34. IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH SAMORE, [] LAUNCHED INTO A STINGING CRITIQUE OF THE USG'S REACTION TO SADDAM HUSAYN'S MAY 1 OUTBURST. HE EXPRESSED BITTER DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN A STRONG STANCH AGAINST SANCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE

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CONGRESS. EUROPEAN STATES, HE NOTED, HAVE DONE EVEN WORSE. HE EXPRESSED DISBELIEF THAT BRITAIN, WHOSE

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CITIZEN HAS JUST EXECUTED ON TRUMPED-UP SPYING CHARGES, AND WHICH HAS IN ITS HANDS EVIDENCE OF IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND "SUPER GUN" PROJECTS, HAS BEEN TRYING TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH BAGHDAD.

35. SAMORE USED THE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD IRAQ IN TERMS LIKE THOSE DISCUSSED [REDACTED] THE U.S. BELIEVES IT WILL HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF INFLUENCING IRAQ IF IT KEEPS OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION. QUESTIONED ABOUT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM SAMORE SAID THE THREAT IS NOT NEAR-TERM.

36. [REDACTED] WARNED THAT IRAQ CAN BUY THE COMPETENCE IT NEEDS TO PURSUE ITS WEAPONS PROGRAMS. HE SAID

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EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN SCIENTISTS ARE WORKING IN IRAQ NOW AND THERE IS NO WAY TO STOP THIS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE OPENING OF EASTERN EUROPE TO THE WEST WOULD BRING WITH IT A FLOW OF NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS SCIENTISTS IN SEARCH OF HIGH-PAYING JOBS IN WELL-FUNDED PROGRAMS. THIS REPRESENTED A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR IRAQ AND LIKE-MINDED STATES.

37. SAMORE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS DANGER EXISTS AND SAID THAT AMBASSADOR KENNEDY HAD ALREADY MET WITH MOST OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES TO URGE THEM TO BE ON THE ALERT FOR SUCH PROCUREMENT EFFORTS. THE EASTERN EUROPEANS ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONTRIBUTING TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

38. [REDACTED] ARGUED THAT THIS PROBLEM IS BROADER -- IRAQ IS COOPERATING WITH BRAZIL ON MISSILES; THE GERMANS HAVE FAILED TO PASS NEW LEGISLATION RESTRICTING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS. SAUDI ARABIA IS ASSISTING IRAQ'S NUCLEAR EFFORTS. SAMORE REPLIED THAT THE U.S. IS NOT AWARE OF ANY NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND IRAQ. THE U.S. IS ALSO SKEPTICAL OF ALLEGATIONS OF ARAB SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, GIVEN SADDAM'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER ARAB LEADERS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED STATEMENTS BY THE SAUDIS INDICATING A WILLINGNESS TO REBUILD THE OSIRAQ REACTOR, BUT SAID THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS THAT AN AGREEMENT TO DO SO HAS EVER REACHED.

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SUPERCOMPUTERS

39. [] RAISED THE ISSUE OF SUPERCOMPUTER SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA NOTING THAT WHILE THE U.S. WOULD NOT
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SELL A CRAY SUPERCOMPUTER TO BAGHDAD, HE ALLEGED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS AGREED TO GIVE ACCESS TO ITS COMPUTER TO IRAQI SCIENTISTS. SAMORE SAID THE U.S. WOULD LOOK INTO THIS REPORT.

ARGENTINA

40. TURNING TO ARGENTINA, [] EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, DURING HIS CURRENT VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES, HAD GIVEN THE ARGENTINES A "CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH." HE NOTED REPORTS OF ARGENTINE COOPERATION WITH LIBYA ON THE CONDOR MISSILE PROJECT. SAMORE RESPONDED THAT, IN THE NUCLEAR AREA, ARGENTINA UNDERSTANDS THE DANGERS OF PROVIDING SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND IRAQ, AND WE EXPECT THEM TO BE CAREFUL IN THIS REGARD.

1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

41. [] SAID THAT ISRAEL HAS NEVER JOINED THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT IT HAS NOT SIGNED THE NPT. ISRAEL WOULD NOT GIVE UP ANY MILITARY OPTION WITHOUT THE SORT OF GUARANTEES ONE WOULD GET FROM A REGIONAL AGREEMENT BASED ON MUTUAL ASSURANCES. HE NOTED THAT THE IMPLEMENTING MECHANISM FOR THE BW CONVENTION IS THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. IN THIS FORUM, ISRAEL'S EXPERIENCES HAVE BEEN "UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE." HE SAID ISRAEL COULD NOT BASE ITS SECURITY ON THE PROMISE OF A U.S. VETO.

ARAB ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

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42. ON THE QUESTION OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IAEA AND THE PROPOSED ARAB ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (AAEA), SAMORE TOLD [] THAT THE U.S. MISSION IN VIENNA IS CONTINUING TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE SECRETARIAT. THE U.S. HAS ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR TO THE AGENCY THAT IF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IAEA AND THE AAEA IS APPROVED, IT MUST NOT CONVEY ANY ENHANCED STATUS TO THE PLO IN THE IAEA. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR APPROACH, AND THAT OF THE SECRETARIAT, IN THE PAST. THIS WOULD LIKELY BE AN ISSUE FOR THE JUNE BOARD MEETING.
IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE

44. [] ASKED WHAT THE U.S. ANTICIPATES ARAB

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MEMBERS OF THE IAEA WILL DO WITH REGARD TO PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL CONFERENCE AND BOARD MEETING. SAMORE INDICATED THAT THE PLO'S STRATEGY FOR THE GENERAL CONFERENCE IS NOT YET CLEAR, BUT THAT THE U.S. HAS SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME LAST YEAR AND WOULD SEEK TO REPLICATE THAT. [REDACTED] AGREED, NOTING THAT THE PLO MIGHT TAKE A LESSON FROM ITS EXPERIENCES AT THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION'S SESSION AND DECIDE TO BACK DOWN. BROWN

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